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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
on technological change. We exploit installations-level inclusion criteria to estimate
the impact of the EU ETS on ﬁrms patenting. We ﬁnd that the EU ETS has increased low-carbon innovation among regulated ﬁrms by as much as 10%, while not
crowding out patenting for other technologies. We also ﬁnd evidence that the EU
ETS has not impacted patenting beyond the set of regulated companies. These
results imply that the EU ETS accounts for nearly a 1% increase in European lowcarbon patenting compared to a counterfactual scenario.
JEL: O3, Q55, Q58, C14
Keywords: Directed technological change, EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Policy
evaluation.
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Introduction

Emissions trading programs have assumed an ever more prominent role in environmental policy over the last few decades. In the US, the Acid Rain Program, the Regional
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and California’s cap-and-trade program are all examples of this trend. Australia, New Zealand, and the Canadian province of Quebec
have all recently created their own cap-and-trade programs to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, and China, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil are individually making moves
toward launching their own. Global carbon markets are today worth over $175 billion
a year (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012), and with so many new initiatives in the works, this
number will likely grow much larger in years to come.
At present, most of the $175 billion a year is accounted for by the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). It launched in 2005, allocating tradable emissions
permits to over 12’000 power stations and industrial plants in 24 countries, accounting
for over 40% of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions.1 It is today the world’s largest
cap-and-trade program. Like all of the new emissions trading initiatives around the
globe, the primary aim of the EU ETS is to reduce carbon emissions, but to do so
through innovation rather than output reduction. When regulated ﬁrms expect to face
a higher price on emissions relative to other costs of production, this provides them with
an incentive to make operational changes and investments that reduce the emissions
intensity of their output. The “induced innovation” hypothesis, dating back to Sir John
Hicks (1932) and restated in the context of environmental policy by Porter (1991) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012), suggests that part of this new investment will be directed toward
developing and commercializing new emissions-reducing technologies. According to this
theory, the EU ETS can be expected to spur development of new low-carbon technologies.
This vision has been articulated many times by EU policy makers, who envisage the EU
ETS to be a driving force of low-carbon economic growth.
In this paper we conduct the ﬁrst comprehensive investigation of the impact of the EU
ETS on low-carbon technological change in the ﬁrst 5 years of the Scheme’s existence.
The EU ETS oﬀers a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of environmental
policy on technological change. It is the ﬁrst and largest environmental policy initiative of
its kind anywhere in the world, which by itself would make it an interesting case to study.
But more important is the fact that, in order to control administrative costs, the EU
ETS was designed to cover only large installations. Firms operating smaller installations
are not covered by EU ETS regulations, although the ﬁrms themselves might be just as
large as those aﬀected by the regulations.2 Because innovation takes place at the level
of the ﬁrm, we can exploit these installation-level inclusion criteria to compare ﬁrms
1

24 countries were included from the beginning. 6 countries have joined since then.
Although the EU ETS regulations are applied at the level of the installation, we will often use
‘EU ETS firms’ or ‘regulated firms’ as shorthand for firms operating at least one EU ETS regulated
installation.
2
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with similar resources available for research and similar patenting histories, but which
have fallen under diﬀerent regulatory regimes since 2005. This provides an opportunity
to apply the sort of quasi-experimental techniques most suited to assessing the causal
impacts of environmental policies (List et al., 2003; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009). Studies
employing these methods have found that environmental regulations inhibit new-plant
formation (List et al., 2003), but stimulate capital investment in existing plants (Fowlie,
2010). To the authors’ knowledge, though, this is the ﬁrst time these methods have been
employed to study the impact of environmental policy on directed technological change.
We use a newly constructed data set that records patenting activities, key ﬁrm characteristics, and regulatory status with respect to the EU ETS. Our data set includes
information on over 30 million ﬁrms across 23 countries, 18 of which took part in the
2005 launch of the EU ETS. We identify over 5’500 ﬁrms operating more than 9’000 installations regulated under the EU ETS, accounting for over 80% of EU ETS-wide emissions. Using this data set, we are able to compare unregulated and would-be regulated
ﬁrms both before and after the EU ETS launched. The low-carbon patent classiﬁcation
recently developed by the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) allows us to identify emissions
reduction technologies. A matched diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences study design enables us to
control for confounding factors that aﬀect both regulated and unregulated ﬁrms (input prices, sector- and country-speciﬁc policies, etc.), as well as ﬁrm-level heterogeneity
(Heckman et al., 1998b,a; Smith and Todd, 2005; Abadie, 2005). Our estimates provide
the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of the EU ETS on directed
technological change.
A casual look at aggregate patent data reveals a surge in low-carbon patenting since
2005. The increase appears larger among EU ETS regulated companies, and our matched
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of the treatment eﬀect implies that the EU ETS is
responsible for a 36.2% increase in low-carbon patenting among our matched sample of
3’428 EU ETS ﬁrms, or an increase of 8.1% across all of the 5’500 EU ETS ﬁrms. This
would account for less than a 1% increase of low-carbon patenting at the EPO. Put
another way, only 2% of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting can be attributed
to the EU ETS.
With respect to concerns that low-carbon innovation would crowd out development
of other technologies (Popp and Newell, 2012), we ﬁnd evidence that the EU ETS has
in fact encouraged patenting for other technologies, but by a very small amount. We
investigate several challenges to the internal and external validity of our results—e.g.
omitted variable bias and a failure of ‘selection on observables’—but our conclusions
appear to be remarkably robust.
3
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For fear that a focus on EU ETS ﬁrms would have blinkered us to a broader indirect
impact of the EU ETS, we identify 12’000 of likely third-party technology providers and
purchasers and test whether these ﬁrms have also responded to the EU ETS. The estimates are only indicative, but we ﬁnd no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had
either a net positive or net negative impact on the patenting activities of third parties.
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that, while EU ETS regulated ﬁrms have responded
strongly, the Scheme so far has had at best a very limited impact on the overall pace and
direction of technological change. The EU ETS is expected to remain an integral part
of the EU’s strategy for building a low-carbon Europe (European Commission, 2011),
but in its current form the EU ETS may not be providing incentives for low-carbon
technological change on a large scale.
Technological change may be the single most important determinant of the long-run
cost of emissions abatement. Consequently, the ability of an environmental policy to
inﬂuence technological change is perhaps one of the most important criteria on which
to judge its success (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Pizer and Popp, 2008). In light of this,
it is not surprising that there are ongoing eﬀorts from both theoretical and empirical
economists to better understand the capacity of environmental policies to induce clean
innovation. On the theoretical side, the past few decades have seen the emergence of a
considerable literature further developing the induced innovation hypothesis, especially
in the context of climate change mitigation (Popp, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
On the empirical side, a large and growing research enterprise is trying to understand
and quantify the link between environmental policies and directed technological change,
often with innovation measured at the level of economic sectors or countries (Newell
et al., 1999; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002; Aghion et al., 2012 and many
others. See Popp et al., 2009, Popp, 2010, and Ambec et al., 2010, for recent surveys).
Our study contributes to this literature, and analyzes the policy impacts at the ﬁrmlevel. The handful of studies that have begun to investigate the innovation impact of the
EU ETS rely on interview-based methodologies and most analyze small unrepresentative
samples (Hoﬀmann, 2007; Tomás et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). Martin et al. (2011)
take extra precautions to ensure consistency across interviews with diﬀerent ﬁrms, and
they conduct the largest study to date covering 450 EU ETS ﬁrms in 6 countries. We
use patent portfolios as an objective measure of technological change, and our study
considers over 5’500 EU ETS ﬁrms in 18 countries, accounting for roughly 80% of the
program as a whole. With this, we provide the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical estimates
of the Scheme’s impact on directed technological change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys the evidence on environmental
4
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policy and directed technological change, especially in the context of emissions trading.
Evidence from the US Acid Rain Program and early studies of the EU ETS inform
us about how the EU ETS is likely to have impacted technological change. In section
3 we familiarize ourselves with our newly constructed data set, and use it to begin
unpacking the characteristics of low-carbon technological change. In section 4 we turn
our eye to estimating the impact of the EU ETS on regulated ﬁrms, and in section 5 we
examine its indirect impact on third-party technology providers and purchasers. Section
6 summarizes and discusses the evidence in light of the broader empirical literature. We
conclude by considering some of the potential policy implications of our ﬁndings, and
directions for future research.

2

Emissions trading and directed technological change

2.1

Empirical background

Several studies have found evidence that environmental policy does impact the direction of technological change (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003;
Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006; Arimura et al., 2007; Lanoie et al., 2007). Popp (2006) ﬁnds
an almost immediate patenting response to domestic clean air regulations in the US,
Germany, and Japan. Johnstone et al. (2010) ﬁnd that renewable energy patents have
increased dramatically as national and international climate change policies have multiplied. But while policy makers continue making this argument, and though there is
empirical evidence to support a general link between environmental policy and directed
technological change, a more careful reading of the literature yields two cautionary observations that seem particularly relevant for the EU ETS.
Firstly, when examining the impact of emissions trading programs speciﬁcally, rather
than environmental policies more broadly construed, the conclusions about its impacts
are more modest. Most earlier studies consider the US Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, launched in 1995. Early estimates suggested nearly half of the emissions reductions
were achieved by installing scrubber technology, and the remainder by switching to coal
with a lower sulphur content (Schmalensee et al., 1998). The scrubber technology existed
before 1995, but had in many instances not been economically viable. The innovation
resulting from the Acid Rain Program thus appears to have been focused on operational
rather than technological change (Burtraw, 2000). Yet there is some evidence of very
narrowly directed technological change. Popp (2003) detects an increase in patents that

5
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improved the eﬃciency of scrubbers.3 This eﬀect was conﬁned to early years under the
new regime though, and the Program has not provided ongoing incentives for technological advancement (Lange and Bellas, 2005). This squares with ﬁndings that the use of
scrubber technology as an emissions abatement strategy has actually declined over time
(Burtraw and Szambelan, 2009). To put it simply, past emissions trading programs like
the Acid Rain Program do not provide a precedent for the kind of induced technological
change EU policy makers are hoping the EU ETS will provide.
Secondly, if we expected the incentives for technological development to be mediated
primarily by augmenting energy prices, we can use historical estimates of the energy
price elasticity of energy-saving technology patents to give us a very rough idea of the
potential eﬀect the EU ETS might be having. Popp (2002) suggests that, even at the
height of the energy crisis of the late 1970s, energy prices only boosted patenting by
3.14%. The carbon price in the EU ETS, having ranged from a peak of near e30 to
a low of near e0 (and spending more time in the lower part of that range), does not
imply anything close to the energy price hikes of the late 1970s. One might therefore
expect the patenting response, if any, to be barely perceptible. This back-of-the-envelope
comparison comes with serious health warnings, of course, not the least of which is that
innovation may be driven more by expectations than currently prevailing prices (Martin
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it can help aid our expectations about the likely impact of
the EU ETS.
So while policy makers envisage the EU ETS as the engine of low-carbon innovation,
and though there is empirical evidence that supports a positive link between environmental policy and directed technological change generally, the two observations above—the
weak patenting response in previous emissions trading programs, and the meager patenting response to be expected from the diluted price signal—invite a degree of skepticism
about strong claims for the ability of the EU ETS to promote innovation. These two
observations, moreover, motivate a special interest in providing policy makers with direct empirical evidence on whether or not the EU ETS is encouraging ﬁrms to develop
new low-carbon technologies.

2.2

The EU ETS and directed technological change

In 2005, the EU ETS launched in 24 countries across Europe, covering roughly 40%
of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions. First, power stations and industrial plants
3
It is worth noting that Title IV of the Clean Air Act, which establishes the Acid Rain Program, also
includes special provisions that reward firms specifically for the use of scrubbers. It is not entirely clear,
therefore, how much was ‘the market’s doing’.

6

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper673

6

Calel and Dechezleprêtre: Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evid

across Europe were classiﬁed according to their main activity: “combustion”, “cement”,
“paper and pulp”, etc. For each category, installations had to meet certain criteria to be
included in the EU ETS. For instance, only combustion installations historically consuming more than 20 MWh a year were covered. The Scheme would then be implemented in
3 trading phases, with successively more stringent emissions caps for each phase. Phase
1, which ran from 2005–2007, was insulated from later phases by prohibiting banking
and borrowing of permits across the phase boundary. Phase 2 (2008–2011) and Phase 3
(2012–2020) allow ﬁrms to bank unused permits for later use, as well as a limited form of
borrowing against future emissions reductions. For each year in Phase 1, over 2 billion
tons-worth of tradable emissions permits were allocated to the more than 12’000 qualifying power stations and industrial plants, and a legal requirement was instituted that each
installation surrender enough permits at the end of each year to cover their emissions.
Prior to the compliance date, however, installation operators could freely trade permits
with each other (as well as with ﬁnancial intermediaries and private citizens).4 The price
of emitting one ton of CO2 would be set in this newly created marketplace. Since 2005,
the spot price has varied between e0 and e30, spending more time in the lower part of
that range. The price of forward contracts has remained steadily above the spot price,
though, suggesting ﬁrms are taking the progressive stringency of the cap into account.
With the price of carbon revealed in the market, installations (or rather the ﬁrms that
operate them) can then make abatement and investment decisions accordingly.
Since it launched in 2005, there has been vigorous debate about whether the EU ETS
would induce ﬁrms to develop new emissions-reducing technologies, many arguing that
an overly generous allocation of emissions permits would largely undermine the incentives
to innovate (Schleich and Betz, 2005; Gagelmann and Frondel, 2005; Grubb et al., 2005).
Indeed, a few early case studies summarized by Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) indicate
that rather than developing new technologies, ﬁrms have been introducing well-known
technological solutions that had simply not been economically viable before the EU
ETS imposed a carbon price on regulated ﬁrms. A growing literature of case-studies
and expert interviews now provides further support for this conclusion. Tomás et al.
(2010) study four large EU ETS regulated Portuguese chemical companies, suggesting
that the EU ETS may have encouraged some energy eﬃciency improvements. Martin
et al. (2011) conduct interviews with nearly 800 European manufacturing ﬁrms, of which
almost 450 operated some EU ETS regulated installations. Using their interview-based
measure of innovation, they ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the expected future stringency of EU
4

See Ellerman et al. (2010) for a more comprehensive review of the design and implementation of the
EU ETS.

7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 673 [2012]

ETS. Few studies have inquired directly about R&D or patenting, however. A survey
of Irish EU ETS ﬁrms tentatively suggests that almost no resources were available for
low-carbon R&D in Phase 1 of the trading program (2005–2007), while many of the ﬁrms
had pursued more operational innovations like installing new machinery or equipment,
making process or behavioral changes, and employing fuel switching to some degree
(Anderson et al., 2011). Hoﬀmann (2007), reporting on the German electricity sector,
ﬁnd that the EU ETS has had an eﬀect on decisions about small-scale investments with
short amortization times, but not on R&D eﬀorts. Neither study, however, provides a
suﬃciently large or representative sample of EU ETS ﬁrms to provide a reliable picture of
the innovation response to the EU ETS, especially since innovation tends to be relatively
concentrated to a small group of ﬁrms. Moreover, neither study oﬀers for comparison a
group of non-EU ETS ﬁrms.
What evidence there is suggests that the practice of fuel switching appears to have
been very important so far. Fuel switching requires neither capital investment nor R&D,
only that power providers bring less polluting gas-ﬁred plants online before coal-ﬁred
ones as demand ramps up. This changes the average fuel mix in favor of natural gas,
and therefore reduces the carbon intensity of output. Fuel switching is a purely organizational innovation. Macroeconomic estimates suggest that the EU ETS reduced total
emissions by roughly 50–100 million tons of CO2 annually in Phase 1, or roughly 3–6%,
compared with a “business-as-usual” scenario (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Anderson
and Di Maria, 2011). Meanwhile, model-based estimates of power sector emissions abatement from fuel switching alone range from 26–88 million tons per year (Delarue et al.,
2008, 2010). These estimates suggest that fuel switching very likely accounts for the lion
share of emissions reductions in the EU ETS so far. This is not a problem in and of
itself, of course. As mentioned earlier, the US Acid Rain Program achieved its emissions
targets in large part by analogous fuel switching strategies, and with little technological
change. However, one should be conscious that in the case of the EU ETS, the capacity for emissions reductions through fuel switching is far more limited compared to the
EU’s longer term targets. Delarue et al. (2008) estimate that fuel switching has the
potential to reduce emission by up to 300 million tons per year, which is no more than a
tenth of what is needed to meet the EU target to cut emissions by 80% by 2050 against
1990-levels.5
All of this provides only fragmentary or indirect evidence on directed technological
change, however. Our purpose, next, is to obtain more direct empirical evidence on
5

The EU target amounts to reducing annual emissions by roughly 4’500 million tons compared to
1990, or roughly 3’500 million tons compared to current emission levels.
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whether or not the EU ETS is encouraging ﬁrms to develop new low-carbon technologies.

3

Unpacking low-carbon technological change

While EU ETS regulations apply at the level of the installation, innovation takes place
at the level of the ﬁrm, and recent advances in linking patent data with company data
makes it possible to construct ﬁrm-level patent portfolios. This paper exploits a newly
constructed patent data set—linking patent portfolios to key ﬁrm characteristics, including whether or not the ﬁrm operates any installations covered by EU ETS regulations.
Patents have been used extensively as a measure of technological change in the recent
induced innovation literature (Popp, 2002, 2006; Johnstone et al., 2010; Aghion et al.,
2012), and the advantages and drawbacks of patents are well understood (see OECD,
2009, for a survey). Patents provide a useful measure of the output of innovative activity
and are available at a highly disaggregated technological level. Having said that, it is
also worth noting that a number of studies have found that patent counts (output) are
highly correlated with R&D expenditures (input) in cross section (Griliches, 1984), and
shift concurrently over time and in response to shocks (Kaufer, 1989). Our main measure
of technological change uses patents ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO). EPO
patents provide a common measure of innovation for all of Europe, unlike self-reported
innovation measures or patents ﬁled with national patent oﬃces, for which the standards
vary from ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm or country-to-country. In addition, EPO patents provide a useful
quality threshold as only high value inventions typically get patented at the EPO.6
Nevertheless, as a robustness test we also repeat our analysis to using quality-weighted
patent counts.7
6

Evidence shows that the highest value technologies are patented in several countries (Harhoff et al.,
2003), and indeed, one of the methods used to measure the value of patents is to count the number of
countries is which they are filed (van Zeebroeck, 2011). Patents filed at the EPO get patented in 6 EPO
member countries on average.
7
Although the EPO provides a common measure of minimum patent quality, the value of patents
is still known to be heterogeneous. We use two ways to account for the quality of patents: forward
citations and family size. Citation data have been widely used in the literature to control for the quality
of patents. With this method, patents are weighted by the number of times each of them is cited in
subsequent patents (see Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005). The family of a patent
is the set of patents protecting the same invention in various countries (patent family information comes
from the DOCDB family table in PATSTAT). Counting the number of countries in which a patent is filed
is another common measure of patent quality (Harhoff et al., 2003; van Zeebroeck, 2011). Family data
also presents the advantage of being more rapidly available than citations (patents are typically mostly
cited two years after their publication, hence four years after they are first filed), which is especially
valuable when dealing with very recent patents as we do. Finally, in some of our robustness tests we
also consider on patents filed with national patent offices to gauge whether our findings depend on how
narrowly we define the patents of interest.
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All patents ﬁled at the EPO are categorized using the European patent classiﬁcation
(ECLA), which includes a recently developed class pertaining to “technologies or applications for mitigation or adaptation against climate change”, or “low-carbon technologies”
for short. This new category (the “Y02” class) is the result of an unprecedented eﬀort
by the European Patent Oﬃce, whereby patent examiners specialized in each technology, with the help of external experts, developed a tagging system of patents related to
climate change mitigation technologies. The Y02 category provides the most accurate
tagging of climate change mitigation patents available today and is becoming the international standard for clean innovation studies8 . These low-carbon technologies include,
to name a few, eﬃcient combustion technologies (e.g. combined heat and power generation), carbon capture and storage, eﬃcient electricity distribution (e.g., smart grids) and
energy storage (e.g. fuel cells). This class helps us measure the direction of technological
change.9 A complete description of the various sub-classes for low-carbon patents used
in the paper can be found in appendix C.
The EPO was set up in 1978. Since then, over 2.5 million patents have been ﬁled with
the EPO, of which just over 50’000 (or 2%) have been classiﬁed as low-carbon inventions.
Our newly constructed data set includes the patent portfolios of over 30 million ﬁrms
located in 23 countries (22 EU countries, plus the US). 18 of these countries launched
the EU ETS in 2005. The other 5 (Norway, Switzerland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the
US) have either joined later or have remained outside of the EU ETS altogether. While
our data is somewhat more geographically restricted than the EPO, the ﬁrms in our
data set account for just over 95% of all patents ﬁled at the EPO, so we are conﬁdent
that we have managed to include the patent history of the vast majority of companies.10
The share of patents protecting low-carbon technologies shows a distinct pattern over
time (ﬁgure 1). There was a surge in patenting for these technologies in the early 1980s,
often attributed to the second oil price shock in the late 1970s (Dechezleprêtre et al.,
2011). The share of low-carbon patents ﬁled each year then stayed roughly level until
the mid-1990s, after which it began to rise again. The share of low-carbon patents has
increased rapidly in recent years, as is particularly evident after 2005, with the share
8

See (Veefkind et al., 2012) for more details on how this category was constructed.
Because the EPO low-carbon classification is not comprehensive, we also test the robustness of
our results to the inclusion of additional patents that other authors have considered low-carbon, in
particular patents pertaining to energy-efficient industrial processes. An updated list of environmentrelated patent classification codes is available from the OECD’s Environmental Policy and Technological
Innovation (EPTI) website: www.oecd.org/environment/innovation.
10
We have also conducted extensive manual double-checking, so we can reasonably assume that companies for which we were unable to find any patent data have actually not filed any patent at the EPO.
It is well documented that only a fraction of companies ever file patents, and this is likely to be especially
true of the EPO that has high administrative costs.
9
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doubling from 2% to 4% in just a few years. A simple Chow test strongly rejects the
hypothesis that there is no structural break in 2005 (P < 0.001).
Figure 1: Share of low-carbon patents (1978–2009)
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While this pattern is robust to using an expanded deﬁnition of “low-carbon technologies”, it is not present for any set of environmentally friendly technologies. To see this,
ﬁgure 1 also plots the share of patents protecting non-greenhouse gas “pollution control
technologies”, as deﬁned by Popp (2006),11 which does not display the same structural
break (one cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural break in 2005 at conventional
signiﬁcance levels). The sudden surge in patenting activity, therefore, appears to be speciﬁc to low-carbon technologies and to coincide with the launch of the EU ETS. Could
the structural break in low-carbon patenting, then, be a consequence of the EU ETS?
Just like the increase in low-carbon patenting in the early 1980s has been attributed
to the oil price shock, the recent surge might be due to rising oil prices. When comparing
the share of low-carbon patenting with the evolution of oil prices (see ﬁgure 2), one
notices that the present upsurge in patenting follows immediately on the heels of rapid
oil price increases in the early 2000s. Patenting for pollution control, on the other
hand, was not responsive to the oil price in the 1980s, and so it is not surprising it has
stayed ﬂat recently. Looking at the aggregate trends over time, clearly, is not enough to
determine whether the increase in low-carbon patenting since 2005 is the result of the
EU ETS, oil prices, or some other factor. In order to isolate the impact of the EU ETS
we must compare the experience of ﬁrms regulated under the EU ETS with those not
covered by the regulation. Both groups will have faced the same oil prices and other
macroeconomic conditions, but starting in 2005 they were subject to diﬀerent regulatory
11

These technologies pertain to reduction of local pollutants including SO2 and NOX .
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It is important to stress that the EU ETS regulates installations (not ﬁrms) by applying certain inclusion criteria. For instance, installations for which the main activity is
“combustion of fuels” are included only if their annual thermal input exceeds a threshold
of 20 MW. For steel plants, the relevant inclusion criterion is instead that the installation
have a production capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour. Installations manufacturing
glass and glass ﬁbre are included only if their melting capacity exceeds 20 tonnes per day.
These are only three examples from a longer list, but the upshot of this conﬁguration is
that what we refer to as EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms can in principle be virtually
identical in all other respects relevant to their patenting behaviour, except for the size
of a single installation.
Our data set also records the regulatory status of 30 million ﬁrms—5’568 ﬁrms in our
data set operate at least one installation regulated under the EU ETS. Together they
operate 9’358 EU ETS regulated installations, accounting for over 90% of regulated
installations and emissions in Phase 1 in the 18 EU ETS countries we are studying, and
roughly 80% of installations and emissions EU ETS-wide (see table 1).12
Having identiﬁed the subset of ﬁrms directly aﬀected by the EU ETS, we can now
look separately at the EU ETS and non-EU ETS trends in low-carbon patenting. Figure
3 shows that the share of low-carbon patents was roughly the same among EU ETS and
non-EU ETS ﬁrms in the 5 years before the EU ETS launched. Economic theory then
predicts that environmental regulations would produce greater incentives to develop new
12
See appendix A for more details on how the link between firm data and regulatory data was
constructed.
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Table 1: Coverage of the EU ETS – The first two columns of this table show the number of Phase 1
installations in each of the 18 countries in our sample, and their allocated emissions (source: CITL). The
following two columns show the percentages of installations and emissions for which the operating firm has
been identified. The two rows at the foot of the table summarise our data set’s EU ETS coverage for our 18
countries as well as as a proportion of the EU ETS as a whole.

Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
UK
Total
Total EU ETS

Number of
installations
217
345
415
399
54
637
1100
1944
121
113
15
418
869
265
191
1072
774
1107
10056
12122

Mton of
emissions
97.8
178.7
290.8
93.1
56.3
133.9
450.2
1486.3
57.7
34.4
9.7
259.3
712.7
110.7
91.4
498.1
67.6
628.0
5256.6
6321.3

Percent of
installations covered
92.2
98.6
92.5
92.7
77.8
84.6
97.5
98.6
76.9
87.6
100.0
87.1
90.0
99.2
90.6
98.5
93.9
83.3
93.1
77.2

Percent of
emissions covered
100.0
100.0
96.9
95.2
99.9
100.0
99.6
99.6
94.7
91.4
100.0
95.6
98.6
99.9
99.9
99.9
98.8
97.0
98.7
82.0

technologies for a regulated ﬁrm than for an unregulated ﬁrm (Milliman and Prince,
1989; Fischer et al., 2003), because the latter is not discharging costly emissions itself
and therefore receives no additional beneﬁt reducing its own emissions. After 2005, the
share of low-carbon patents among EU ETS ﬁrms looks to have risen faster than among
non-EU ETS ﬁrms.13 The diﬀerence does not become apparent until the start of the
second trading phase in 2008, which was widely expected to constrain emissions more
tightly than Phase 1 had done. Could the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting, after
all, be a consequence of the EU ETS?
Let us naively suppose for a moment that the diﬀerences visible in ﬁgure 3 are entirely
due to the EU ETS. This permits us to calculate a simple estimate of the impact of the
EU ETS on low-carbon patenting. Since 2005 EU ETS ﬁrms have ﬁled 2’189 climate
related patents, compared to 972 patents in the 5 preceding years (an increase of 125%).
13
One might be concerned that the surge in patenting activity by EU ETS firms compared to non-EU
ETS companies might have been accompanied by a concurrent drop in the relative average quality of
inventions patented by EU ETS companies. However, the average number of citations received by lowcarbon patents filed by EU ETS companies since 2005 does not significantly differ from those filed by
non-EU ETS companies. Similarly, the size of low-carbon patent families is the same for EU ETS and
non-EU ETS companies.
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Figure 3: Comparing the share of low-carbon patents (1978–2009)
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Non-EU ETS ﬁrms ﬁled 19’841 and 12’037 patents protecting low-carbon technologies in
the corresponding periods (an increase of 65%). Low-carbon patenting grew at similar
rates among EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms in the pre-EU ETS period. If we then
were to assume that the number of low-carbon patents ﬁled by EU ETS ﬁrms, had they
not been regulated, would have grown at the same rate experienced by non-EU ETS
ﬁrms, we can calculate a naive estimate of how many low-carbon patents the EU ETS
has added so far: 2’189 - 1.65 × 972 = 585.2. If 585.2 of the low-carbon patents ﬁled at
the EPO in 2005–2009 were additional, this amounts to a 2.6% increase in the number of
low-carbon patents at the EPO compared to what we expect it would have been without
the EU ETS.
This is clearly a very naive estimate. It assumes that the patenting of non-EU ETS
ﬁrms provides an accurate counterfactual estimate of how EU ETS companies would
have behaved had they not become regulated. This assumption may be problematic in
case non-EU ETS ﬁrms are also responding to the new regulations. A more pressing
concern, though, is that the two groups of ﬁrms appear to be very diﬀerent even before
the EU ETS. Just looking at the patenting of these two groups reveals that while only 1
in about 5’500 ﬁrms is EU ETS regulated, they account for roughly 1 in 12 low-carbon
patents ﬁled in the 5 years before the EU ETS launched. Clearly, EU ETS companies
do not appear to be representative of the population of ﬁrms as a whole. One could
quite easily imagine, then, that some unobserved change or shock (other than the EU
ETS) would have had systematically diﬀerent impacts on these two sets of ﬁrms. The
naive calculation above cannot isolate the impact of EU ETS in such a case. To begin
to address this shortcoming, it is better to restrict our view to a subset of companies
14
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that are more similar on pre-2005 characteristics. For such a group of ﬁrms, it would be
more diﬃcult to imagine post-2005 changes (apart from the EU ETS) that would have
systematically diﬀerent impacts on the patenting activities of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
ﬁrms. Rather than comparing all EU ETS ﬁrms with all unregulated ﬁrms, this more
restricted comparison is likely to yield a better estimate of the impact of the EU ETS.
Let us now turn, therefore, to the task of constructing such a comparison.

4

The direct impact of the EU ETS

4.1

Matching

We face a diﬃcult identiﬁcation problem. Looking at changes over time is not suﬃcient
to identify the impact of the EU ETS because it is not possible to adequately control for
things like oil price ﬂuctuations and changes in macroeconomic conditions. Comparing
EU ETS ﬁrms with non-EU ETS ﬁrms at a given time allows us to better control for
these time-variant factors. On the other hand, as we have discovered, the typical EU
ETS ﬁrm appears very diﬀerent from the typical unregulated ﬁrm even before the EU
ETS launched in 2005. This comparison may therefore wrongly attribute some lowcarbon patents to the EU ETS that are really the result of other systematic diﬀerences
between EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms.
Comparing the changes over time for two groups of ﬁrms that are more similar prior
to 2005 would make it more diﬃcult to explain away any diﬀerence in outcomes by
factors other than the EU ETS. Ideally one would like to match each EU ETS ﬁrm with
a group of non-EU ETS ﬁrms with similar resources available and facing similar demand
conditions, regulations (other than the EU ETS), input prices, etc. In this section we
perform just such a matching exercise. As we restrict ourselves to more closely matched
ﬁrms there will inevitably be a number of EU ETS companies for which no good match
can be found. What is lost in sample size, however, is regained in terms of accuracy and
robustness (see, for instance, Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).
Along with patent portfolios, our data set contains information on the country and
economic sector in which ﬁrms operate,14 as well as other ﬁrm-level information such as
turnover and employment. Using this data, we have tried to assign to each of the 5’568
EU ETS ﬁrms a group of similar but unregulated ﬁrms (setting aside all companies with
14

Economic sectors are defined at the 3-digit level for the NACE Rev. 2 industry classification. A
few examples of these sector definitions will illustrate how narrowly sectors are defined: “electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution”, “steam and air conditioning supply”, “manufacture of glass
and glass products”, “manufacture of plastic products”, “manufacture of rubber products”.
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ownership ties to EU ETS ﬁrms, see appendix A). Though, this has not always been
possible, for two main reasons. Firstly, the records of turnover become less and less
complete further back in time. In fact, we only have pre-2005 records on the turnover
for 3’564 out of the 5’568 EU ETS ﬁrms. Secondly, though EU ETS regulations were
applied at the installation level rather than directly to the ﬁrm, one might expect two
very similar ﬁrms to receive the same regulatory treatment more than occasionally.
Diﬀerent regulatory fates are possible if, say, an EU ETS ﬁrm operates an installation
just large enough to be covered by EU ETS regulations, while the matched control
operates one or more installations just below the threshold. But even though we have
a very large pool of ﬁrms to start with, sometimes there will be no such comparators
available within the same country and sector. Due to lack of suitable comparators, the
sample of EU ETS ﬁrms is further reduced to 3’428. We return to the omitted ﬁrms
below in section 4.3, to consider the possible consequences of dropping them from our
sample.
For each of the 3’428 matched EU ETS ﬁrms we have found at least one unregulated
ﬁrm that operates in the same country and economic sector. This means that they
are likely exposed to much the same business and regulatory environment, input prices,
country and sector speciﬁc shocks and trends. The ﬁrms are also matched to have
similar pre-2005 turnover, patenting records, and age, since their available resources and
capacity for R&D and patenting are likely important determinants of a ﬁrm’s response
to the EU ETS.15 The resulting matched sample consists of 3’428 EU ETS ﬁrms and
4’373 non-EU ETS ﬁrms.
Figure 4 compares the empirical distributions of EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms
in our matched sample on a few key variables used to construct the match. EU ETS
regulated ﬁrms have slightly greater pre-EU ETS turnover on average, and ﬁled slightly
more patents. However, as can be seen in table 2, we reject the hypotheses that the
empirical distributions diﬀer between the EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms.
Because ﬁrms look similar within each match, the ﬁrms’ pre-2005 observable characteristics do not help us predict (better than chance) which ﬁrm in each matched group
would become regulated after 2005 and which ﬁrm in each group would ﬁle more lowcarbon patents. Conditional on pre-EU ETS observable characteristics, the assignment
of ﬁrms to the EU ETS appears random. In a naive sense, we have recovered the identifying conditions present in a randomized experiment (though we subject this claim to
further scrutiny below).
15

See appendix B or technical details about how the matching was implemented.
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Figure 4: Comparison of matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms
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Panel (a) displays the empirical quantile-quantile (e-QQ) plot for average turnover in the 4 years before the EU
ETS (2001–2004). Each dot gives the value for one EU ETS firm and the average for a group of matched non-EU
ETS firms, shown on logarithmic scales. 2001 is the first year for which turnover is recorded in our data set for
any firm. Panels (b) and (c) show the e-QQ plots for the total number of patents and the number low-carbon
patents filed 2000–2004, respectively, once again shown on logarithmic scales.

4.2

Results

For each ﬁrm we measure the change in the number of low-carbon patents from 2000–2004
to 2005–2009. This means that, even after matching, we take account of any additional
time invariant ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. The outcomes of the matched control ﬁrms are
then subtracted from the outcomes of the EU ETS ﬁrms to obtain the diﬀerence-indiﬀerences. A striking feature of the patent counts used to calculate these diﬀerencein-diﬀerences is the large number of zeros. It is a very common feature of patent data
that most ﬁrms do not ﬁle any patents at all, and this arises from a similar censoring
problem that usually motivates the use of the Tobit estimator. We can imagine there
being a latent variable that can take any value, but we can only observe numbers of zero
or greater.
To implement Tobit estimator in our case, though, we would have to explicitly model
the propensity of ﬁrms to ﬁle at least one patent. This is by no means a straightforward
exercise, and getting the model wrong carries with it the risk of introducing new biases.
The analogous maximum likelihood estimator will likewise generally be inconsistent, especially when applied to panel data (Chay and Powell, 2001). Instead, we can account
for the censoring at zero using a Tobit-modiﬁed empirical-likelihood estimator, as out-
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Table 2: Equivalence tests for matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms

Turnover (in Mil. Euro)
Patents
Low-carbon patents
Year of incorporation
Any pre-2005 patents (binary)
Economic sector
Country

Median difference between
EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms
1.60
0
0
0
Exactly matched
Exactly matched
Exactly matched

Equivalence
range
± 523.39
± 9.30
± 0.25
± 5.97
–
–
–

Critical equivalence
range (5% sign. lev.)
± 13.25
± 1.99
± 1.99
± 0.49
–
–
–

The first column from the left reports the median difference between EU ETS firms and non-EU ETS firms in
our sample for the key matching variables. Apart from those variables shown in figure 4, matched on the year of
incorporation interacted with other variables, since turnover and cumulative patent filings mean different things
for an old and new firms. We have also matched exactly for whether (1) or not (0) a firm filed any patents
before 2005, for country of operation, and for economic sector (defined at the 3-digit level for NACE Rev. 2).
The empirical distributions of EU ETS and non-EU ETS characteristics are judged to be substantively equivalent
if the location shift parameter (as defined for Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test) lies within the ‘equivalence range’
reported in the second column. We follow the convention of letting this range be ± 0.2 standard deviations of the
distribution of the pooled sample (Cochran and Rubin, 1973; Ho and Imai, 2006). Using Wilcoxon’s signed-rank
test, we are just unable reject at the 5% significance level the hypothesis that the location shift parameter lies
within the the ‘critical equivalence range’ reported in the final column. (The signed-rank test has been adjusted
to account for the fact that our variables are censored at zero, using a method outlined by Rosenbaum (2009, ch.
2). More details in section 4 below.) As can be seen by the fact that the range in the third column is contained
within that in the second column, we can reject the hypotheses of substantive differences for all variables, except
for low-carbon patents. This last failure to reject is because of the small number of firms that filed any low-carbon
patents prior to 2005, as is evidenced by the fact that the same test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the
difference is zero. Standard t-tests for differences in means reject the hypotheses of substantive differences for all
variables (not reported).

lined by Rosenbaum (2009, ch. 2). The idea is as follows. We observe the low-carbon
patents ﬁled by EU ETS ﬁrms and non-EU ETS ﬁrms. In estimating a treatment eﬀect,
we would normally search for a number that, if subtracted from each of the observations
in one of our two samples, would as nearly as possible equate the distributions of the two
samples (using some metric of similarity). The problem, of course, is that this assumes
a constant treatment eﬀect that applies even to ﬁrms with zero patents. Instead, we can
adjust our observed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences in a way that takes the censoring into account, and then re-calculate our similarity measure. Each of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences,
∆, is adjusted according to the formula:
{
max((Tt − Tt−1 ) − τ, −Tt−1 ) − (Ct − Ct−1 ) if τ ≥ 0
∆=
(Tt − Tt−1 ) − max((Ct − Ct−1 ) + τ, −Ct−1 ) otherwise
where Tt and Tt−1 are the numbers of low-carbon patents ﬁled by an EU ETS ﬁrm in
the treatment period t (2005–2009) and the pre-treatment period t − 1 (2000–2004),
respectively. Ct and Ct−1 , are the corresponding numbers for the matched non-EU ETS
ﬁrms, and τ is the treatment eﬀect. The point estimate of the treatment eﬀect is then
the value of τ for which the similarity measure is maximized, and the (1−α)% conﬁdence
18
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interval is the set of values of τ for which we cannot reject the alternative of diﬀerence
at the α% level of signiﬁcance. We implement this estimator using as our similarity
measure the p-value calculated from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This provides a
non-parametric alternative to the Tobit estimator.
We estimate a treatment eﬀect of τ = 2 additional low-carbon patents for our EU
ETS ﬁrms, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of (1, 5). The matched EU ETS ﬁrms ﬁled
a total of 316 low-carbon patents in the period 2005-2009. Subtracting 2 low-carbon
patents from each of our matched EU ETS ﬁrms (and accounting for censoring at zero)
tells us that these ﬁrms together would have ﬁled 232 low-carbon patents in the absence
of EU ETS regulations. Our estimated treatment eﬀect therefore implies that EU ETS
has prompted 84 (53, 129) additional low-carbon patents amongst our sample of EU ETS
ﬁrms, or an increase of 36.2% (20.2%, 69.0%) compared to what we expect would have
happened in the absence of the EU ETS. Because these ﬁrms only account for a small
portion of all patents, however, this remarkable impact translates into an increase of lowcarbon patenting at the EPO of only 0.38% (0.24%, 0.58%) compared to what we expect
it would have been in the absence of the EU ETS. If we think our estimate applies to all
of the 5’568 EU ETS ﬁrms, we can use their patenting records to calculate that, once we
account for censoring at zero, the EU ETS is responsible for 188 (114, 319) additional
low-carbon patents. This amounts to a 8.1% (4.7%, 14.5%) increase in their low-carbon
patenting, or a 0.85% (0.51%, 1.45%) increase in the total number of low-carbon patents
ﬁled at the EPO in 2005–2009 compared to the counterfactual. The ﬁrst thing to note
about these numbers is that they are substantially smaller than what was suggested by
our naive calculations above (585.2 additional low-carbon patents, or a 2.6% increase
in low-carbon patents at the EPO, see table 3). Second, because these numbers are so
small relative to the totals, it is likely we would not have recognized the impact to be
anything diﬀerent from zero, had we been studying patent counts at a more aggregated
level.
To address the issue of the direction of technological change, we must compare this
with the impact on patenting for other technologies. Environmental regulations like the
EU ETS increase the cost of production and can in principle encourage patenting for any
technology that reduces it, be it a low-carbon technology or not. The induced innovation
hypothesis holds that a policy like the EU ETS would have a disproportionate impact on
low-carbon technologies, but this is an essentially empirical matter. There is a related
concern, also, that the increase in low-carbon innovation will actually displace, or crowd
out, development of other technologies (Popp and Newell, 2012). We can address these
questions using the same matched sample and estimator described above. We estimate
19
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that the EU ETS has added on average 1 other patent (1, 1.99). This translates into
305 (305, 512.9) additional patents for other technologies, which represents an increase
of 1.9% (1.9%, 3.2%) in their patent ﬁlings for non-low-carbon technologies, or a 0.041%
(0.041%, 0.068%) increase in patenting for other technologies at the EPO. Comparing
these numbers with the estimates from the previous paragraph, we see that the EU ETS
has had a disproportionate impact on patenting for low-carbon technologies: 36.2% vs.
1.9% (diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at 5% level). Put another way, the Scheme has nearly
had a 20 times greater impact on low-carbon patenting, but it has not crowded out
patenting for other technologies. If we think our estimate applies to all of the 5’568
EU ETS ﬁrms, the EU ETS would be responsible for 554 (554, 963.86) additional other
patents, which amounts to a 0.77% (0.77%, 1.34%) increase in their other patenting, or
a 0.074% (0.074%, 0.13%) increase in the total number of other patents ﬁled at the EPO
in 2005–2009.
Table 3: Summary of results

Additional low-carbon patents
As % increase
As % increase of EPO
Additional other patents
As % increase
As % increase of EPO

Matching estimates
Matched sample
Full sample
84
188
(53, 129)
(114, 319)
36.2
8.1
(20.2, 69.0)
(4.7, 14.5)
0.38
0.85
(0.24, 0.58)
(0.51, 1.45)
305
554
(305, 512.9)
(554, 963.86)
1.9
0.77
(1.9, 3.2)
(0.77, 1.34)
0.041
0.074
(0.041, 0.068)
(0.074, 0.13)

Naive estimates
Full sample
585.2
36.5
2.6
9072.8
16.0
1.2

Point estimates, along with 95% confidence intervals in brackets where applicable. The matched sample estimates
consider the impact only for the 3’426 matched EU ETS firms, while full sample estimates consider the impact
for all 5’568 EU ETS firms in our data set. The matching estimates are calculated using our point estimates
of τ obtained for the matched sample of 3’426 EU ETS firms and 4’373 non-EU ETS firms. Naive estimates
are included for comparison. They have been calculated using the full set of 30 million non-EU ETS firms to
construct a counterfactual, as in section 3.

Our results are summarised for convenience in table 3, along with comparable naive
estimates for the full sample of EU ETS ﬁrms (calculated as in section 3). The naive estimates display the same general pattern as our matching estimates, showing increases in
patenting for both low-carbon and other technologies, but with a pronounced direction.
When compared to our matching estimates, however, the naive calculations are revealed
to substantially overestimate the impact of the EU ETS. The matching estimates still
suggest the EU ETS has had a positive and notable impact on low-carbon patenting
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among EU ETS ﬁrms, though relative to the overall pace of low-carbon technological development, the impact appears to have been much smaller, boosting low-carbon
patenting by only a fraction of a percent. On the one hand, our ﬁndings contradict
early prognostications that over-allocation of emissions permits in the EU ETS would
completely undermine the incentives for low-carbon innovation. On the other hand, even
a quite remarkable response among EU ETS ﬁrms—whether 36.2% among matched EU
ETS ﬁrms or 8.1% among the full sample—translates into rather small impact from an
economy-wide perspective, less than a 1% increase at the EPO. Putting it another way,
of the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting seen in ﬁgure 1, roughly 2% can be attributed to the EU ETS.16 It is worth noting that this apparently small impact relative
to the overall pace of technological change is not simply an arithmetical artifact of the
small number of EU ETS ﬁrms, however, as is demonstrated by the fact that the naive
estimator is more than three times higher.
Before settling on an interpretation of our estimates, however, we must ask whether
they are really best explained by the EU ETS having had a very small impact? Perhaps
these small numbers should instead caution us that we may have underestimated the
impact? Let us therefore investigate challenges to the internal and external validity of
our results.

4.3

Robustness tests

Is our conclusion driven by an omitted variable?

The primary challenge for any

matching study is to justify the assumption that ﬁrms that appear similar are similar in
unmeasured dimensions as well—often called ‘selection on observables’. In a randomized
experiment one can rely on the law of large numbers to achieve similarity between a
treated and control group on both observed and unobserved characteristics. Matching,
on the other hand, achieves an observed similarity by construction, so similarity on
matched characteristics cannot be read to as evidence that the treated and control ﬁrms
are also similar on unobserved characteristics.
A simple test of whether matching has achieved balance on unobserved variables is
to look at a variable that was not used to construct the matches. We have one such
variable in our data set: the number of employees. As ﬁgure 5 and table 4 show, the
empirical distributions of number of employees of the EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms
16

The number of low-carbon patents filed at the EPO increased by 9054 from the period 2000-2004
to 2005-2009. The 188 additional low-carbon patents we have attributed to the EU ETS correspond
to 2% of this increase. Even under the more generous framing that the upward trend from 2000-2004
would have continued unabated in 2005-2009, the post-2005 ‘surge’ was only 4725.5 low-carbon patents,
of which the 188 additional low-carbon patents would amount to barely 4%.
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are very similar, and we can reject the hypothesis that they are materially diﬀerent.
We can therefore have some conﬁdence that matching has indeed recovered the central
identifying condition of a randomized experiment.

10’000
100
1

Employees of EU ETS firms

Figure 5: Comparison of matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms on ‘unobserved’ variable

1

100

10’000

Employees of non−EU ETS firms

Table 4: Equivalence test for matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms on ‘unobserved’ variable

Employees

Median difference between
EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms
25

Equivalence
range
± 904.07

Critical equivalence
range (5% sign. lev.)
± 106.75

See caption of table 2 for details on how to read this table.

This test, though reassuring, is perhaps too simplistic. Other unobserved diﬀerences
between regulated and unregulated ﬁrms might still bias our ﬁndings. What kind of an
omitted variable could in principle undermine conﬁdence in our estimate?
Imagine that we have an omitted binary variable that tells us whether a ﬁrm would be
covered by a complementary carbon policy. If this variable is negatively correlated with
EU ETS regulations and positively correlated with increases in low-carbon patenting (or
vice versa), this omission would cause us to underestimate the impact of the EU ETS.
Using the model for sensitivity analysis developed by Rosenbaum (1987) and Rosenbaum
and Silber (2009), we can infer precisely how large the omitted variable bias would have
to be in order to undermine conﬁdence in our estimate relative to some larger alternative.
22
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In order for our 3’428 matched EU ETS ﬁrms to have boosted the number of lowcarbon patents ﬁled at the EPO by 5%, say, they would have to have ﬁled 1062 additional
low-carbon patents. Since they did not ﬁle this many low-carbon patents in 2005–2009
in total, we can comfortably rule out that the EU ETS would have had such a large
treatment eﬀect even if all of the patents were additional. To have boosted low-carbon
patents by just 1%, 223 of their low-carbon patents would have to have been additional.
This translates back into a treatment eﬀect of τ = 20.4—more than 10 times higher than
our original estimate. In order to increase our point estimate beyond this level, we would
have to postulate an omitted variable that, if observed before 2005, would successfully
predict more than 83 times out of a 100 (a) which ﬁrm in our matched pairs escapes
EU ETS regulations and (b) which ﬁrm in our matched pairs would most increase their
low-carbon patenting. Even if the omitted variable predicted (a) almost perfectly, it
would still have to predict (b) 73 times out of 100. For the milder threshold of just
being unable to reject the hypothesis that the the treatment eﬀect is 20.4, we would
still have to postulate an omitted variable that makes these prediction successfully more
than 70 times out of 100.17 We have estimated above that our sample of matched EU
ETS ﬁrms account for only a 0.38% increase in low-carbon patenting at the EPO. If one
ﬁnds an example of a complementary policy that was implemented in such a systematic
fashion across the EU and caused such a predictable boost in the low-carbon patenting,
we would have to concede that they may have boosted low-carbon patenting by as much
as 1%. Even then, it is not obvious that this would seriously challenge the conclusion
that the EU ETS has had but a limited direct impact on low-carbon patenting overall.
Another omitted variable candidate—whether a ﬁrm had high or low carbon emissions prior to 2005—is generally expected to be positively correlated with both a ﬁrm’s
chances of becoming regulated and with their chances of increasing their low-carbon
patenting. The omission of a variable with these properties would imply we have overestimated the impact of the EU ETS above. To reduce our point estimate to zero, we
would need to postulate an omitted variable that predicts more than 81 times out of 100
(a) which ﬁrm in our matched pairs became EU ETS regulated and (b) which ﬁrm in our
matched pairs would most increase their low-carbon patenting. It would need to make
these predictions successfully more than 71 times out of 100 to make us just unable to
reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that the treatment eﬀect is really zero.18
17

In Rosenbaum’s notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment effect is 20.4 for a sensitivity
parameter of Γ = 2.65, and we are just unable to reject this treatment effect at the 5% significance level
for Γ = 1.4. This can be decomposed into the biases present in treatment assignment and outcomes
using propositions in Rosenbaum and Silber (2009).
18
In Rosenbaum’s notation, it is just possible that the estimated treatment effect is 0 for a sensitivity
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In sum, matching has achieved balance on at least one ‘unobserved’ characteristic,
which might suggest it has balanced other unobserved variables as well, like a truly
randomized experiment would have. Even if this is not the case, though, it appears our
estimate of the low-carbon treatment eﬀect is reasonably robust to both negative and
positive omitted variable biases. If anything, the fact that the estimate is ever-so-slightly
more sensitive to a positive bias would tend to reinforce our earlier conclusion that the
EU ETS has had but a small direct impact on low-carbon patenting.
Are the estimates valid beyond our sample?

A more serious challenge to our

conclusion, perhaps, is to justify extrapolating from our sample of 3’428 EU ETS ﬁrms
to all EU ETS ﬁrms. This type of calculation might lead us to underestimate the impact
of the EU ETS if the ﬁrms omitted from estimation have had a systematically stronger
reaction compared to those ﬁrms in our sample. This is a question of selection bias.
We can address this concern in three ways: (1) increasing the sample size, (2) calculating an upper bound for our estimates, and (3) calculating a lower bound for the
out-of-sample response necessary to qualitatively aﬀect our conclusions. Firstly, because
turnover ﬁgures become more widely available in 2005, we are able to increase sample
size if we allow ourselves to use 2005 turnover ﬁgures to construct the matches. This is
not generally desirable, because the EU ETS might have aﬀected 2005 turnover, which in
turn had some eﬀect on low-carbon patenting. If this is the case, the matching estimate
using 2005 turnover would be biased because it omits this channel. However, because
using 2005 turnover gives us access to a greater number of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
ﬁrms, it may still provide a reasonable test of whether our ﬁndings apply to the EU ETS
more broadly.
Matching using 2005 turnover ﬁgures allows us to successfully match an additional
427 EU ETS ﬁrms, producing 3’855 matched groups in total. The point estimates for this
sample are 2.75 (1, 5.99) for low-carbon patents and 1 (1, 1.99) for other patents. The
point estimate for the impact on low-carbon patents is slightly larger than before (but
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent), but the same for other patents. These estimates translate into
92.25 (49, 133.89) additional low-carbon patents and 318 (318, 530.85) additional other
patents across our 3’855 EU ETS ﬁrms. In percentage terms they imply a somewhat
smaller patenting response than before: increases of 18.9 (9.2, 30.0) and 2.4 (2.4, 4.2)
respectively. This amounts to a 0.42% (0.22, 0.60) increase in low-carbon patenting
at the EPO and a 0.042 (0.042, 0.071) increase in patent ﬁlings for other technologies,
parameter of Γ = 2.34, and we are just unable to reject this treatment effect at the 5% significance level
for Γ = 1.45.
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which is virtually identical to our original estimates. The typical matched ﬁrm still looks
much the same, which is what one would expect if we were simply ﬁnding more ﬁrms
around the same EU ETS thresholds. The EU ETS ﬁrms in our original matched sample
therefore appear to be representative of a larger portion of the EU ETS. On the other
hand, it also means that this re-match does not so much help address concerns that
the EU ETS is aﬀecting low-carbon patenting among the atypical companies for which
suitable unregulated matches could not be found the ﬁrst time around.
It is, nevertheless, possible to bound the eﬀect that these atypical ﬁrms can have on
the impact estimates. Suppose we were able to perfectly match every one of the 2’140 EU
ETS ﬁrms we were forced to omit. Suppose further that the hypothetically matched nonEU ETS ﬁrms have not ﬁled any patents since 2005, a strict lower bound. Because we
observe the low-carbon patenting of the EU ETS ﬁrms, these two assumptions allow us to
calculate the upper bound diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for each of these 2’140 EU ETS ﬁrms.
Pooling them with the 3’428 previously diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, we can then estimate
the upper bound of the treatment eﬀect.19 This procedure produces point estimates of 13
(4, 43.99) for low-carbon and 6 (4, 10.99) for other patents. These high point estimates
are driven in large part by a small number of proliﬁc patenters that were previously
omitted, but are now matched to hypothetical non-EU ETS ﬁrms with zero patents
after 2005. Subtracting a large number of patents from each ﬁrm and accounting for
censoring at zero, therefore, does not add as many patents as the higher point estimates
perhaps might suggest. The new estimates translate into 524 (275, 952.9) additional lowcarbon patents and 2093 (1582, 3176.95) additional other patents, or increases of 26.7%
(12.4%, 62.2%) and 3% (2.3%, 4.7%) respectively. While there is still a clear direction
to induced technological change, it is less pronounced than for our original estimates. In
comparison with the total numbers of patents that would otherwise have been ﬁled at
the EPO in each category in this period, the additional patents represent a 2.4% (1.2%,
4.5%) increase in low-carbon patenting and a 0.28% (0.21%, 0.42%) increase in patenting
for other technologies. In economic terms, the upper bounds are perhaps slightly more
noteworthy than our original estimates, though we are now very aware of the kind of
extremely favourable and unrealistic assumptions needed to generate results that even
begin to demand attention. And even then, the results are perhaps not so impressive as
to seriously challenge the conclusion that the EU ETS has had a limited direct impact
on low-carbon patenting.
19

This bound is analogous to the sharp bounds derived by Manski (2007, ch. 2) for situations with
missing data. The bound is sharp in the sense that it does not impose any restrictions on the process
that leads to ‘missingness’.
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Our third strategy to address concerns about external validity is to calculate what
out-of-sample response would be necessary in order to qualitatively aﬀect our conclusion.
Our sample covers 9’358 out of the 12’122 installations that fell under EU ETS regulation
in 2005 (see table 1). In order for the EU ETS to have boosted low-carbon patenting
by 5%, say, EU ETS ﬁrms would together have to have ﬁled 1062 additional low-carbon
patents in 2005–2009. Subtracting our best estimate of 188 additional low-carbon patents
for the 5’568 ﬁrms operating 9’358 EU ETS installations, this leaves the operators of the
remaining 2’764 installations to have ﬁled 874 additional low-carbon patents. To put
it another way, we estimate that the average EU ETS ﬁrm in our sample ﬁled roughly
0.03 extra low-carbon patents, but even if the remaining 2’764 were operated by as many
ﬁrms (another charitable assumption), the EU ETS ﬁrms outside our sample would have
to have ﬁled 0.32 additional low-carbon patents in the same period. The out-of-sample
response would have to be 10 times greater than the in-sample response. Even if we use
the upper bound estimate (in-sample ﬁrms ﬁled 524 additional low-carbon patents), the
out-of-sample ﬁrms would have to have ﬁled 538 extra low-carbon patents, or at least
0.19 per ﬁrm, which is still more than twice the upper bound for our in-sample ﬁrms
(0.09). These strong responses appear especially unlikely in light of the fact that most of
the out-of-sample ﬁrms operate in countries with lower patenting propensities (Cyprus,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Slovenia).
It seems, therefore, that none of the strategies to address concerns about external
validity—increasing sample size, computing upper bounds, and calculating necessary
out-of-sample responses—seriously challenge our earlier conclusion. The EU ETS appears to have had a very limited direct impact on low-carbon technological change.
Other robustness tests. Above we have tried to address the most pertinent challenges to our interpretation of the results, but one can imagine still other explanations
for why the direct impact of the EU ETS appears to have been so small. We have tried
to test several of these:
• Are matched non-EU ETS ﬁrms also responding to EU ETS? If so, ﬁrms less
exposed to the EU ETS and to direct competition with EU ETS ﬁrms would
perhaps be expected to respond less. We re-match our EU ETS ﬁrms to similar
ﬁrms in Norway, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Romania (4 countries that did not
launch the EU ETS in 2005, and two of which have remained outside). We also
re-matched our EU ETS ﬁrms to similar US ﬁrms. Neither comparison returns
an estimate of the treatment eﬀect signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that reported above
(see appendix D for further details).
26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper673

26

Calel and Dechezleprêtre: Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evid

• Did the main patenting response occur after the Directive was adopted in 2003,
but before the EU ETS launched in 2005? Some authors have highlighted the
possibility that ﬁrms patent in anticipation of new regulations (Dekker et al.,
2012). To address this concern, we re-matched our EU ETS ﬁrms using 2003 as
the treatment year instead of 2005. The treatment eﬀect for the period 2003–
2004 actually indicates that prospective EU ETS ﬁrms would actually have ﬁled
1.75 additional low-carbon patents if not for the EU ETS (again, zero adjusted),
though the number is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In other words, there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the patenting activities of EU ETS and non-EU ETS
ﬁrms in this period.
• Is the result an artifact of how we measure low-carbon patents? To address this,
we looked at using an expanded deﬁnition of low-carbon patents. This does not
materially aﬀect our conclusions, however. Moreover, it seems that our results
cannot be accounted for by a failure to adjust for the quality of patents either.
The number of citations for patents held by EU ETS ﬁrms do not increase more
than for non-EU ETS ﬁrms (see appendix D for more details).
• Is there some other hidden bias? Perhaps we are only picking up the low-carbon
technology component of a broader trend toward environmental technologies going
on among our EU ETS ﬁrms. We look at the number of patents ﬁled by matched
EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms protecting other ‘pollution control technologies’,
as deﬁned by Popp (2006). Since these technologies do not help mitigate emissions
covered under the EU ETS, we would not expect the EU ETS to have had any impact. A hidden bias in our study design, perhaps some unknown omitted variable,
would manifest itself as ﬁnding a treatment eﬀect here that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Our estimated treatment eﬀect is τ = 0.75, but it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.20
It appears, then, that EU ETS has had a positive and notable impact on low-carbon
patenting among EU ETS ﬁrms. It has spurred development of low-carbon technologies
without crowding out innovation for other technologies. Since EU ETS ﬁrms account
for only a small proportion of low-carbon patents, however, the impact on EU ETS
regulated ﬁrms is negligible on a European scale. None of the above challenges seems to
20

Roughly 20% of EPO patents classified as one of Popp’s pollution control technologies also fall into
the low-carbon category. Excluding these, however, does not substantively affect the outcome.
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oﬀer a compelling alternative explanation to this interpretation of the results.21
If we accept, then, that the impact of the EU ETS on regulated ﬁrms does not
account for the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting seen in ﬁgure 1, might the EU
ETS still be indirectly responsible? Has it encouraged third parties to develop lowcarbon technologies in the hope of selling or licensing them to newly regulated EU ETS
ﬁrms? We investigate this question next.

5

The indirect impact of the EU ETS

The preceding analysis strongly suggests that the direct impact of the EU ETS has not
been suﬃcient to account for the apparent surge in low-carbon patenting since 2005.
Could the impact of the EU ETS instead have been largely indirect, spurring third
parties to develop new low-carbon technologies?
There are three major reasons why we would expect the indirect impact to be comparatively small. Firstly, economic theory predicts that environmental regulations would
produce greater incentives to develop new technologies for directly regulated ﬁrm than
for third parties (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Fischer et al., 2003). The asymmetry arises
because the latter group is not discharging costly emissions themselves and receive no
additional beneﬁt reducing its own emissions. To the extent that the EU ETS is encouraging low-carbon technological change, therefore, economic theory predicts this response
to be strongest among EU ETS ﬁrms.
Secondly, EU ETS ﬁrms have ﬁled over 120’000 patents with the EPO since 2000,
circa 2.5% of which protect low-carbon technologies. These are clearly ﬁrms with above
average innovation capabilities. To argue that the bulk of the response to the EU ETS
comes from third-party technology providers amounts to saying that these EU ETS
ﬁrms with well-developed low-carbon innovation capabilities are responding mostly by
purchasing technologies from others, rather than developing the technologies in-house to
suit their own speciﬁc needs.
Thirdly, the EU ETS ﬁrms in our sample are very likely technology providers themselves. As highlighted in the previous paragraph, EU ETS ﬁrms do develop new technologies themselves, including low-carbon technologies. While some ﬁrms may innovate
21
One must be careful also because some of the tests we have used to investigate these alternative
explanations, though addressing one potential source of bias, may introduce new biases of their own
(e.g. using 2005 turnover figures). The point here, however, is that to replicate our results each time,
the new bias would have to be of the same sign and magnitude as the hypothesized bias in the original
match. This explanation becomes increasingly unlikely with each new test, and the explanation that our
estimate is unbiased appears more likely by comparison.

28

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper673

28

Calel and Dechezleprêtre: Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evid

in the hope of meeting new demand from EU ETS ﬁrms, others might expect greater
opportunities to purchase the technologies developed by EU ETS ﬁrms. The indirect
impact of the EU ETS is the net of these two responses.
These three reasons suggest that the indirect impact of the EU ETS would be comparatively small, but all claims about the indirect eﬀect need to be met with the same
level of skepticism as any other empirical hypothesis. It is a very diﬃcult task to cleanly
estimate the indirect impact of the EU ETS, not least because of the diﬃculty involved
in identifying ﬁrms more likely to either provide new technologies to EU ETS ﬁrms or to
which EU ETS ﬁrms are more likely to provide new technologies. We can, nevertheless,
make a start.
Consider the set of ﬁrms that had ﬁled at least one patent jointly with an EU ETS
ﬁrm prior to 2005. A joint patent ﬁling records a technological partnership with an
EU ETS ﬁrm. One might then expect these ﬁrms to be more likely than an average
non-EU ETS to either provide technologies to EU ETS ﬁrms once the regulations came
into force, or to demand new technologies from EU ETS ﬁrms. They are likely to be
good candidates for studying the indirect impact of the EU ETS. By comparing this
set of ﬁrms with other non-EU ETS ﬁrms, therefore, we might hope to gain at least
some partial insight as to the net indirect impact of the EU ETS. It is worth noting,
though, that while technology provision is an asymmetric relationship, co-patenting is
of course symmetric. Hence, we cannot separate co-patenters into technology providers
and demanders even if each co-patenter could in principle be classiﬁed as one or the
other. Nevertheless, we can provide an indicative estimate of the net indirect impact of
the EU ETS.
From patent records we can identify 11’603 non-EU ETS ﬁrms that each ﬁled at
least one patent jointly with an EU ETS ﬁrm in 1978–2004. Many of these ﬁrms are no
longer active or operate in countries not in our data set, which prevents us from matching
them. Additionally, as before there are many ﬁrms for which historical data are missing,
and a few for which we simply cannot ﬁnd suitable comparators. Our matched sample
therefore contains 2’784 co-patenters and 19’361 similar ﬁrms that had not ﬁled a joint
patent with an EU ETS ﬁrm prior to 2005.22 Figure 6 and table 5 show the properties
of our matched sample.23
22
Compared to when EU ETS firms were matched earlier, finding a single good comparator here was a
good indicator that there were many good comparators available. We have kept all of these comparators
in our matched sample to reduce the variance of our estimates.
23
On average, co-patenters have historically filed more patents than EU ETS firms. It is no mystery
why—to be a co-patenters a firm must have filed at least one patent prior to 2005, while EU ETS firms
had no such requirement to meet.
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Figure 6: Comparison of matched co-patenters and non-co-patenting firms
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Table 5: Equivalence tests for matched co-patenters and non-co-patenting firms

Turnover (in th. Euro)
Patents
Low-carbon patents
Year of incorporation
Any pre-2005 patents (binary)
Economic sector
Country
Employees

Median difference between
EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms
14.90
0
0
0
Exactly matched
Exactly matched
Exactly matched
1.66

Equivalence
range
± 304’382.80
± 7.07
± 0.17
± 5.48
–
–
–
± 1’613.82

Critical equivalence
range (5% sign. lev.)
± 1’421.00
± < 0.01
± 0.99
± 0.50
–
–
–
± 20.66

See caption of table 2 for details on how to read this table. Again, the failure to reject the hypothesis of difference
for low-carbon patents is a consequence of the small number of firms that filed any low-carbon patents prior to
2005. The same test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the difference is zero. Standard t-tests for differences
in means reject the hypotheses of substantive differences for all variables (not reported). For completeness, the
results from the robustness test of checking balance on employees is also included at the bottom of this table.

We estimate a treatment eﬀect of τ = 0.99 additional low-carbon patents among
our co-patenters, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of (−0.99, 1.99). We cannot say with
conﬁdence, therefore, that the EU ETS has had any net impact on the low-carbon
patenting of co-patenters. Even taking the point estimate at face value, it translates
into a mere 47.52 additional low-carbon patents. Although it would represent a quite
dramatic response, on the order of a 32.4% increase compared to what it would have
been without the EU ETS, it would still translate into a negligible increase relative to
the number of low-carbon patents ﬁled at the EPO (0.2%). Extrapolating the number
to all 11’603 co-patenters would naturally make it look as if the EU ETS has had a
30

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper673

30

Calel and Dechezleprêtre: Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evid

more impressive indirect impact, but since the estimate does not even stand up to a
conventional signiﬁcance test, such an exercise is not likely to be informative.
The picture is not much more encouraging for other technologies either. We estimate
that the EU ETS has on average subtracted 0.745 other patents (−0.99, −0.01) for copatenters. We are just barely able to reject the hypothesis that the eﬀect is actually
zero, but this rejection does not withstand even the slightest challenge to robustness.
Moreover, even if the point estimate were true, it would suggest that the EU ETS has
crowded out patenting for non-low-carbon technologies among co-patenters.
These numbers oﬀer no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had an indirect
impact on patenting. A patent ﬁled jointly with an EU ETS ﬁrm is a record of a
technological partnership, be it the case that the co-patenter has provided technologies
to EU ETS ﬁrms or vice versa. In either case, one would expect that co-patenters are
more likely than an average non-EU ETS ﬁrm to supply new technologies to EU ETS
ﬁrms once the EU ETS launched, or to demand new technologies from EU ETS ﬁrms.
Yet, taken together, co-patenters appear to behave no diﬀerent to other non-EU ETS
ﬁrms. It is of course incredibly diﬃcult to identify potential technology providers and
demanders for the purposes of estimation, so our results should not be over-interpreted.
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings can perhaps be read as a reasonable indication that the EU
ETS has had no net indirect impact on directed technological change. At the very least,
it poses an empirical challenge for those wishing to argue otherwise.

6

Discussion

The EU ETS launched in 2005, amid both promises and pessimism. It has aimed to
encourage the development of low-carbon technologies by putting a price on carbon
emissions. In this paper we have investigated the Scheme’s success in this regard during
the 5 years subsequent to its launch.
A casual look at aggregate patenting suggests there has been an increase in lowcarbon patenting since 2005, but there are several obstacles to isolating the impact of
the EU ETS. Comparing patenting behaviour prior to and after 2005 risks conﬂating
the impact of the EU ETS with other changes, like rapidly rising oil prices. Yet, looking
only at the period after 2005 and comparing EU ETS regulated ﬁrms with those that
escaped regulation risks conﬂating the impact of the EU ETS with other systematic
diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics that might also drive patenting. Employing a matched
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences study design has permitted us to account for ﬁrm-level timeinvariant heterogeneity, and to isolate that part of the change that does not depend on
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systematic diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics.
We ﬁnd evidence that the EU ETS has had a strong impact on the patenting behaviour of EU ETS regulated ﬁrms. Our best estimate for a sample of 3’428 EU ETS
ﬁrms implies that the Scheme has increased their low-carbon patenting by 36.2% compared to what we expect would have happened in the absence of the EU ETS. What is
more, our estimates suggest that the Scheme has also encouraged EU ETS ﬁrms to increased their patent ﬁlings for non-low-carbon technologies by 1.9%. The EU ETS thus
appears to have had a disproportionate impact on patenting for low-carbon technologies,
but it has not crowded out patenting for other technologies.
Extrapolating our point estimates to 5’568 EU ETS ﬁrms across 18 countries (and
accounting for censoring at zero), the EU ETS would account for an 8.1% increase in
low-carbon patenting and a 0.77% increase in patenting for other technologies. Because
of the targeted nature of EU ETS regulations, however, these responses translate into a
quite unremarkable nudge on the pace and direction of technological change—a 0.38%
boost to low-carbon patenting at the EPO (0.85% for the full sample), and a meagre
0.041% boost to patenting for other technologies (0.074% for the full sample).
To test whether our focus on EU ETS ﬁrms would have blinkered us to the Scheme’s
broader eﬀects, we have also attempted to estimate the indirect impact of the EU ETS.
To this end, we have compared non-EU ETS ﬁrms with at least one patent jointly ﬁled
with an EU ETS ﬁrm, with otherwise similar non-EU ETS ﬁrms. Although we can only
provide indicative estimates, we ﬁnd no compelling evidence that the EU ETS has had
either a net positive or net negative impact on the patent ﬁlings of potential technology
providers and demanders.
Our ﬁndings suggest a reinterpretation of the broader empirical literature on environmental policy and directed technological change. Several studies of the impacts of
inclusive standards and energy or pollution taxes ﬁnd evidence that the environmental
policy does indeed encourage directed technological change (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996;
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Popp, 2002, 2003, 2006; Arimura et al., 2007; Lanoie
et al., 2007). In contrast, studies of previous emissions trading schemes, like the US Acid
Rain Program, at best unearth evidence of very small impacts on directed technological
change (Popp, 2003; Lange and Bellas, 2005). Our results indicate that this discrepancy
may be a consequence, not of weaker innovation incentives provided by emissions trading instruments, but of the fact that previous studies have used aggregate measures of
innovation while cap-and-trade programs tend to concern a comparatively small number
of ﬁrms. The impact on these ﬁrms may in fact be quite large, even in the EU ETS
where permits in the initial trading phases were very likely over-allocated. When their
32

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper673

32

Calel and Dechezleprêtre: Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evid

response is compared to the overall pace of technological change, however, the eﬀect
appears negligible. Someone studying the impact of an emissions trading program by
looking at patenting records at a more aggregated level is therefore likely to overlook the
Scheme’s strong but targeted eﬀect. Conversely, the impact of more inclusive environmental policies, like standards, energy taxes, and pollution taxes, may be more easily
detected because it is spread across so many ﬁrms, even if the change in behaviour
for each ﬁrm is quite small. Debates about the relative costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent
environmental policy instruments already consider the impacts on pace and direction
technological change of central importance (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Pizer and Popp,
2008). Our results, read in combination with the ﬁndings of the broader literature,
suggest that environmental policy instruments may diﬀer also in the distribution of impacts on directed technological change. This could be potentially signiﬁcant because of
the positive spill-overs usually associated with innovation. It is an interesting question
for future research, therefore, whether this could change the economic, or indeed the
political calculus of instrument choice for environmental policy.
There are many other questions too that we have not answered in this paper. Our
aim has been to establish what the overall impact of the EU ETS has been on directed
technological change. Some readers, though, might be interested to know more of the
impact in their own country, or perhaps in a particular economic sector. Such questions
are much more diﬃcult to answer with conﬁdence. They involve estimating many more
parameters, and there are fewer observations to estimate each one. Future research
may give us a more granular picture of the impact of the EU ETS across countries and
economic sectors. In focusing on the EU ETS, moreover, we also have not identiﬁed
what has caused the post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting in Europe. It would be
an interesting exploratory exercise to search for the other factors contributing to this
development (e.g. renewable energy policies). At present, we can establish only that
the EU ETS seems to have played no more than a very limited part. A third set of
questions relate to the innovation incentives attributable to speciﬁc features of the EU
ETS. For instance, would we have observed a greater impact if the price of permits had
been higher? Or if the permits had been auctioned instead of allocated for free? It is not
feasible to test these hypotheses at present, given the lack of variation in EU ETS rules
so far. Future changes to the rules may provide opportunities to study these speciﬁc
questions.
Our results also have broader policy implications. The EU ETS forms an integral part
of the European Union’s roadmap to a low-carbon economy in 2050 (European Commission, 2011). Policy makers in New Zealand, the United States, Australia, China, Japan,
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South Korea, and elsewhere, can also learn from the EU ETS experience. So far, it
appears that emissions reductions in the EU ETS have come largely from operational
rather than technological changes, much like in past emissions trading programs. Emissions reductions have so far come largely from measures like fuel switching, but we know
that such abatement strategies will not be enough to reach the EU’s ambitious longer
term targets. New low-carbon technologies are needed. Indeed, our results indicate that
EU ETS regulated ﬁrms are cognizant of this fact, and are responding accordingly. Even
so, because the impact of emissions trading appears to be concentrated to a relatively
small group of ﬁrms, their response looks to nearly vanish when considered in relation
to the overall pace and direction of technological change. For this reason, the Scheme in
its current form might not be providing the economy-wide incentives necessary to bring
about low-carbon technological change on a larger scale.
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A

Data

For 8 of the countries in our sample, the company registration numbers of the installation
operators were obtained directly, either from national emissions trading registries or from
the Community Independent Transactions Log (CITL) (the EU body to which national
registries report). For the remaining 13 countries in our data set that participated in
the 2005 launch of the EU ETS, a combination of exact and approximate text matching
methods were used to establish a link between ﬁrm data and regulatory data. This was
complemented by further manual searches, and extensive manual double-checking.
The ﬁrm data set allows us to identify majority ownership. Using this information,
we excluded non-EU ETS ﬁrms that were owner, sister company, or subsidiary to an EU
ETS ﬁrm. This reduces the chance of matching two potentially dependent observations.

B

Matching

The matches were constructed using GenMatch() from the R-package Matching. It uses
a genetic search algorithm to search the propensity score space for a speciﬁcation that
minimizes imbalances on the whole set of covariates (see Sekhon, 2007, for details). We
used variable ratio matching with replacement, so that each EU ETS ﬁrm could be
matched to one or more non-EU ETS ﬁrms depending on how many similar non-EU
ETS ﬁrms could be found.

C

Patents

We use the patent codes available at www.oecd.org/environment/innovation. For our
main measure of low-carbon patents we use the EPO patent classes for low-carbon
patents deﬁnition, detailed in Veefkind et al. (2012). Table 6, adapted from Veefkind
et al. (2012), lists the main patent classes along with some examples of technologies for
each class:

D

Details of other robustness tests

Are matched non-EU ETS firms also responding to EU ETS? The matched
ﬁrms that are not regulated by the EU ETS may nevertheless respond to it, either directly, or indirectly because they engage in competition with EU ETS ﬁrms. This would
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Table 6: Climate change mitigation patent categories (EPO’s Y02 class)
Patent code

Description

Y02C 10/00

CO2 capture or storage

Y02C 20/00
Y02E 10/00

Y02E 20/00

Y02E 30/00
Y02E 40/00
Y02E 50/00
Y02E 60/00
Y02E 70/00

Capture or disposal of greenhouse gases
other than CO2
Energy generation through renewable
energy sources
Combustion technologies with mitigation
potential
Energy generation of nuclear origin
Technologies for efficient electrical power
generation, transmission or distribution
Technologies for the production of fuel of
non-fossil origin
Technologies with potential or indirect
contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions mitigation
Other energy conversion or management
systems reducing GHG emissions

Example technologies
Chemical or biological separation, ad- or
absorption, membrane technology,
condensation etc.; subterranean or
submarine storage
N2O, methane, perfluorocarbons,
hydrofluorocarbons or sulfur hexafluoride
Geothermal, hydro, oceanic, solar
(photovoltaic and thermal), wind
Combined Heat and Power (CHP),
Combined Cycle Power Plant (CCPP),
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
(IGCC), synair, oxyfuel combustion, cold
flame, etc.
Fusion and fission
Reactive power compensation, efficient
operation of power networks, etc.
Biofuels, from waste
Energy storage (batteries, ultracapacitors,
flywheels.), hydrogen technology, fuel
cells, etc.
Synergies among renewable energies, fuel
cells and energy storage

bias our estimates. If very similar unregulated ﬁrms are responding by innovating more,
a comparison of EU ETS ﬁrms and matched non-EU ETS ﬁrms will under-estimate the
impact of the EU ETS. If very similar unregulated ﬁrms are responding by innovating
less, this comparison will over-estimate the impact of the EU ETS. To examine these
possibilities we have re-matched our EU ETS ﬁrms to companies operating in European
countries that did not participate in the 2005 launch of the EU ETS (Norway, Switzerland, Romania, and Bulgaria), and then separately to US companies. These comparisons
are less likely to suﬀer from this kind of bias, because the matched non-EU ETS ﬁrms
are less exposed to the market created by the EU ETS and less likely to be directly
engaged in competition with EU ETS companies.24
Table 7 reports the estimated treatment eﬀects for both the European and US rematched samples, along with our original estimates for comparison. The re-matched
point estimates are smaller than our original estimate (and both insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero), which would tend to indicate that very similar unregulated ﬁrms in EU ETS
countries perhaps are innovating less than they would have without the EU ETS. Our
original estimate, then, may if anything have overestimated the impact of the EU ETS.
24

While this comparison helps address a potential bias introduced by non-EU ETS firms responding
to the EU ETS, it is not able to control for between-country differences.
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Table 7: Treatment effect estimates using ‘distant’ matches

Norway, Switzerland,
Romania, and Bulgaria
USA
Original estimate

1
(0, 1.99)
-1
(-1.99, 0.99)
2
(1, 5)

Due to between-country diﬀerences, however, which these re-matched estimates cannot
control for, one should exercise caution in recommending such an interpretation. Neither
of the re-matched estimates diﬀer signiﬁcantly from our original estimate, and as such
do not seem to oﬀer a substantive challenge to our ﬁndings.
Is the result an artifact of how we measure low-carbon patents? It is possible
that our ﬁnding is an artifact of our particular measure of low-carbon technological
change. If we compare our matched EU ETS and non-EU ETS ﬁrms using expanded
deﬁnition of “low-carbon technologies”, the result does not appear to change materially
(see table D). Our original estimate was that the EU ETS accounts for a 36.2% increase
in low-carbon patenting among matched EU ETS ﬁrms, a 8.1% increase across our full
sample of EU ETS ﬁrms, and no more than a 1% increase across our study area. The
new treatment eﬀect estimates suggest the EU ETS may have increased low-carbon
patenting among matched EU ETS ﬁrms by 32.4%, a 7.1% increase across our full
sample, and no more than a 1% increase across our study area. The new numbers are
well within our original conﬁdence intervals, and do not appear to present a challenge
for our interpretation of the results. Our ﬁndings therefore appear robust to how the
outcome is deﬁned.
Table 8: Estimates with different definitions of “low-carbon technologies”

Extended definition
Standard EPO definition

Additional low-carbon patents
Matched sample
Full sample
As % increase
As % increase of EPO As % increase As % increase of EPO
32.4
0.34
7.1
0.77
(20.3, 62.5)
(0.24, 0.54)
(4.5, 12.3)
(0.50, 1.28)
36.2
0.38
8.1
0.85
(20.2, 69.0)
(0.24, 0.58)
(4.7, 14.5)
(0.51, 1.45)

A related concern is that patent counts would omit any EU ETS response that
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appears in the form of a change in the quality of patents. To address this concern, we
test whether the EU ETS has systematically changed the number of citations received by
low-carbon patents held by EU ETS relative to non-EU ETS ﬁrms. Our results, reported
in table 9, indicate that the EU ETS has not had a signiﬁcant impact on patent quality.
Table 9: Changes in quality of low-carbon patents

Additional citations per firm

2.25
(-0.99, 17.99)
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